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COMMENTARY

A Republican-Liberal's Perspective
hose ~ho think of themsel.ves as republican or civi_c :i~er~ls, as I
do, will surely be of two minds about Seyla Benhab1b s 'Dismantling the Leviathan: Citizen and State in a Global World" [Spring
2001 ]. In some respects, Professor Benhabib's thoughtful essay is quite
congenial to republican liberalism. She insists on the importance of
human rights, for instance, and she looks for ways to expand political
participation. Her indictment of "civic republicanism," however,
requires a republican-liberal response.

T

There are three problems with Benhabib's argument, the first
being that het criticism of civic republicanism is misdirected. Her
target is "civic republicans like Michael Walzer," who "conflate the
boundaries of the ethical community, which is inherently culturebound, with those of the democratic polity, which is not culture-bound in
the same manner and to the same degree" (her emphasis). If this statement
accurately reflects Walzer's views, then he was surely right to protest,
in his response to Benhabib's essay, that he is no civic republican.
From Aristotle and Cicero to Hannah Arendt and Michael Sandel,
republicans have sought to promote the civic virtues of the publicspirited citizen. They believe that the members of the res publica ought
to be self-governing participants in public affairs, and, following
Cicero, their conception of "public" is of a group of people united
under law. Hence the old definition of a republic as "an empire of
laws, not of men." In principle, then, republicans have no reason to
insist that citizens must share ties of blood, ethnicity, or culture, and
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they can be quite happy with the "constitutional patriotism" that
Habermas ha.s endorsed and Benhabib apparently accepts.
There is a difference, though, between principle and practice. This
difference points to the second problem with Benhabib's criticism of
civic republicanism. Republicans acknowledge that civic virtues require cultivation and reinforcement. If the members of a polity are to
take the part of public-spirited citizens, there must be some sense in
which they understand themselves as part of a public-that is, as
people engaged in a common, if not all-embracing, enterprise. Cultural considerations surely play a part here-through a common
language, civic education, and shared traditions-as they foster feelings of attachment and solidarity. Civic republicans will join Benhabib
by resisting, in principle, the conflation of cultural with political
integration, but they will think that it is neither easy nor prudent, in
practice, to draw a sharp distinction between culture and politics.
Political integration is primary, however, and cultural considerations
are important to the republican only insofar as they promote the sense
that one is part of a public.
The third problem concerns Benhabib's policy recommendations,
which call for "porous borders" and limited voting rights for noncitizens. Her reasons for extending" democratic participation rights ... at
the local and regional state levels" to noncitizens are neither clear nor
compelling. Her point, presumably, is that noncitizens have a stake in
decisions made at these levels, so they should have a say in them. But
they will also have a stake-and possibly a greater one-in decisions
made at higher levels. Why, then, should noncitizens not have a vote
at the national or state level? The answer, I suppose, is that decisions
at the upper levels are too important; voting in local and regional
elections is a low-risk way in which nondtizens may try their civic
wings before becoming full-fledged citizens. That answer, however,
runs counter to the presumption that people should have a vote
whenever they have a stake in the outcome. It also betrays a failure to
appreciate the im~ortance of local or regional decisions, which are
sometimes more salient to the people they affect, as the "Nimby"
syndrome attests, than national-level decisions.
I also worry that Benhabib's recommendations may be self-defeating. That is, their effect may well be to dilute and discourage
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citizenship, and thus run counter to Benhabib's aim of "making
erstwhile strangers and foreigners into partners in a community of
democratic interpretation and articulation" (her emphasis). Benhabib
will agree, I think, that citizenship has an ethical as well as a legal
dimension-that one may be a citizen, in the legal sense, without
being a "good" or "real" or "true" citizen. That much seems implied
by her desire to help foreigners become "partners in a community."
When she writes, however, of "political globalization," "transnational
political membership," and voting rights for people who may be
"unwilling ... to change their citizenship of origin," she hints at a kind
of free-floating, cosmopolitan citizenship that is unlikely to encourage
the public-spirited attitude one expects of partners in a community.
Despite her cautious statements about the need for "minimum residency, language, employment, and family status requirements," the
picture emerges of a world in which political exit and entrance are so
easy that citizens, in the legal sense, will have little reason to exercise
voice within or demonstrate loyalty to their supposed communities.
That is why republican liberals must hesitate, at least, to endorse
Professor Benhabib's recommendations. Yet they are closer to her
position, in their republicanism as much as in their liberalism, than
she recognizes. Republican liberals do not want to see people consigned to "permanent alienage" or denied the opportunity to become
partners in a democratic community any more than does Benhabib.
Whether her transnational means will accomplish this shared civic
end is the point at issue.

Richard Dagger
Arizona State University
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